





Which Concept of Concept for Conceptual Engineering?
Manuel Gustavo Isaac1 
Received: 14 September 2020 / Accepted: 8 August 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. 
However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the pur-
poses of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, 
proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for 
evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineer-
ing. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept 
that can be used in conceptual engineering—namely, the philosophical and psycho-
logical ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed 
methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual 
engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses 
its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which 
the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual 
engineering.
1 Introduction
Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. 
However, little has been so far written on how best to conceive of concepts for the 
purposes of conceptual engineering.1 So little, in fact, that the current situation is 
still aptly characterized as follows:
There’s of course already a smorgasbord of options for how to think about 
concepts […]. However, and this is the strange part, those who talk of concep-
tual engineering as operating on concepts don’t start by making choices on this 
smorgasbord. They often just talk about ‘concepts’, their engineering, and then 
leave it at that. (Cappelen 2018: 141)
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Or, more recently, by hinting at a possible explanation:
Proponents of th[e] standard account of conceptual engineering tend to say 
very little about what concepts are. I suspect this is because they don’t think 
much needs to be said about this. Philosophers speak of concepts all the time 
[…]. Proponents of the standard account of conceptual engineering appear to 
think that there is no problem simply co-opting this ‘concept talk’, trusting that 
philosophers, at least, will know how to interpret it […]. (Deutsch 2020a: 4)
The aim of this paper is to fill this foundational gap, which concerns the very subject 
matter of conceptual engineering. I will proceed in three main steps. After briefly 
presenting my understanding of conceptual engineering (Sect. 2), I will propose a 
methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a concept of concept 
to the purposes of conceptual engineering (Sect. 3). Then, I will develop a typology 
that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual 
engineering: The philosophical and the psychological concepts of concept (Sect. 4). 
Finally, I will compare these two types of concepts of concept, evaluating them 
with the proposed methodological framework (Sect. 5). After weighing some of the 
possible objections to my proposal (Sect.  6), I will conclude that the psychologi-
cal concept of concept, in comparison to the philosophical one, has better prospects 
for making conceptual engineering actionable—that is, capable of being effectively 
applied to specific case studies (Sect. 7).
2  The Basics
At first glance, conceptual engineering offers an updated take on philosophi-
cal methodology as consisting of the study of our concepts.2 A key feature of this 
renewed approach is its normative agenda: Conceptual engineers aim to prescribe 
what concepts we should have and use, rather than simply describe the concepts we 
do have and use. Although there is no unifying framework for conceptual engineer-
ing research, current work in the field shares several core principles, albeit tacitly.3
Firstly, concepts are usually treated as representational devices that serve cogni-
tive functions for the execution of some cognitive tasks—that is, tasks whose execu-
tion requires the exercise of some cognitive competences. For instance, how the con-
cept of sexual harassment enables its victims to make sense of the offensives they 
have experienced in a hostile work environment, or how the concepts of the GDP 
2 See Isaac (2021b) on why conceptual engineering should be about concepts, instead of any other repre-
sentational devices (linguistic meanings, intensions, speaker-meanings, etc.), on pain of pragmatic incon-
sistencies otherwise.
3 For example, see Brigandt and Rosario (2020), Brun (2016), Burgess and Plunkett (2013a), Burgess 
and Plunkett (2013b), Cappelen (2017), Cappelen (2018), Cappelen and Plunkett (2020), Chalmers 
(2020), Dutilh Novaes (2020b), Eklund (2014), Floridi (2011), Haslanger (2020), Machery (2017), Nado 
(2020a), Plunkett (2015), Plunkett (2016), Prinzing (2018), Scharp (2020), Simion (2018b), Thomasson 
(2020), among many others.
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metrics help to measure a country’s economic progress. Secondly, it is typically 
assumed that better concepts lead to better ways of thinking, speaking, and behav-
ing. For instance, one may consider that the concept of sex has been aptly replaced, 
in the social context, by that of gender in order to make sense of and fight against the 
many persistent inequalities of our social reality. Thirdly, it is generally believed that 
our conceptual apparatus can be (re-)engineered, and for the better.
In addition to these shared theoretical principles, the way in which conceptual 
engineering is applied as an ameliorative method commonly follows a two-step pro-
cess. First, there is an assessment phase during which the quality of a conceptual 
device is typically measured in terms of its functional efficacy—that is, its fitness 
for its actual or intended function.4 Here the goal is to identify improvable features 
(such as deficiencies to fix) of a given conceptual device in terms of how well it 
fulfills its actual or intended function. Importantly, during this phase, the function 
of a concept itself may be found to be detrimental in some respect and thus in need 
of being revised or replaced by some new function (Burgess and Plunkett 2013b; 
Nado 2020a; Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Thomasson 2017, 2020); for instance, Has-
langer (2000) has advocated for repurposing the extant concept of woman so that it 
challenges the many persistent gender-based inequities of our social world, instead 
of tracking females according to their biological sex.5 Then comes an improvement 
phase in which strategies for improving the conceptual device under considera-
tion (such as for fixing its deficiencies) are prescribed, with a view to determining 
whether and how a given concept should be used. Importantly, both of these phases 
pertain to the normative dimension of conceptual engineering and depend on some 
preliminary descriptive work that generates the data to process. And, because con-
ceptual engineering never takes place in a void, treating the descriptive phase with 
importance is critical for the whole enterprise, while ignoring it might lead to ‘dis-
improving’ things (cf. footnote 5).6
4 The notion of “function” is used here in its ordinary sense, without any substantial metaphysical com-
ponent, and rather as that which simply qualifies a device qua device—that is, as something that has been 
made and/or is used to fulfill some purpose. Presumably, every conceptual engineer agrees about framing 
concepts in this way. Hence the widespread use of the word ‘device’ in the literature.
5 One might think that, in such case, there’s no need to start by assessing the actual or intended function 
of a given conceptual device. But, that would be a mistake, because diagnosing the need for revising or 
replacing a detrimental function of some concepts presupposes having identified and established before-
hand the detrimental aspect(s) of that function (cf. Haslanger 2012: 223–224). Otherwise, one might end 
up worsening the functionality of something that was perfectly functional, resulting in some sort of Ver-
schlimmbesserung (‘disimprovement’) then. As Thomasson (2020: 454) warns, “conceptual engineering, 
no less than civil, does not take place in a vacuum.” Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me 
on this point.
6 The following caveat seems appropriate here, formulated however in terms of analysis (instead of engi-
neering): “[I]n practice conceptual analysis is often partly descriptive and partly prescriptive, and it is 
also often difficult to identify which component of an analysis is descriptive, and which is prescriptive: 
Analysis often describes the content of a concept and regiments it in one stroke” (Machery 2017: 217). 
Note that the importance of preliminary descriptive work is often overlooked in the literature that deals 
with conceptual engineering qua philosophical method. In addition to Machery (2017), other exceptions 
include Burgess and Plunkett (2013b), Dutilh Novaes (2016), Eklund (2021), Nado (2021), Plunkett 
(2016), Thomasson (2020), as well as some whose work reframes Carnapian explication as a precursory 
form of conceptual engineering (e.g., Brun 2016; Dutilh Novaes 2020a; Koch 2019; Schupbach 2017; 
Shepherd and Justus 2015).
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In light of this, conceptual engineering can be understood as a metaphilosophical 
movement that aims to normatively ameliorate the cognitive quality of our concep-
tual devices in terms of their functional efficacy.7 It is worth adding to that char-
acterization that conceptual engineers never see conceptual amelioration as an end 
in itself, but rather, in terms of cognitive efficacy, as a means of changing how we 
reason, communicate, and behave toward each other, with a wide scope and a strong 
impact on the whole of our cognitive life. This was eloquently articulated in a semi-
nal article by Burgess and Plunkett (2013a: 1096–1097):
Arguably, our conceptual repertoire determines not only what beliefs we can 
have but also what hypotheses we can entertain, what desires we can form, 
what plans we can make on the basis of such mental states, and accordingly 
constrains what we can hope to accomplish in the world. Representation ena-
bles action, from the most sophisticated scientific research, to the most mun-
dane household task. It influences our options within social/political institu-
tions and even helps determine which institutions are so much as thinkable. 
Our social roles, in turn, help determine what kinds of people we can be, what 
sorts of lives we can lead. Conceptual choices and changes may be intrinsi-
cally interesting, but the clearest reason to care about them is just that their 
non-conceptual consequences are pervasive and profound.
Such broad-spectrum ambitions, in terms of scope and impact on the whole of our 
cognitive life, ought to be seen as another distinctive feature of the conceptual engi-
neering movement.
3  The Bootstrapping Strategy
With the basics now in place, we can turn to the main problem that this paper 
addresses; namely, which framework is best suited to conceiving of concepts for 
conceptual engineering. To tackle this problem, the first step is to establish a pro-
visional method for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept to 
the purposes of conceptual engineering. What we are searching for is some kind 
of adaptable set of step-by-step instructions for the amelioration of our conceptual 
apparatuses. Despite its notorious limitations, Carnap’s (1950) method for expli-
cating concepts provides us with just such a framework.8 Carnapian explication 
squares well with both the evaluative and normative dimensions of the two phases 
of conceptual engineering (Sect. 2). Furthermore, it administers a set of weighted 
8 See Brun (2016, 2020), Cordes (2020), Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017), Dutilh Novaes (2020a), Pinder 
(2017, 2020), Schupbach (2017), Shepherd and Justus (2015) on how to overcome the limitations of Car-
napian explication in the spirit of conceptual engineering.
7 As Nado (2020a: 17) puts it: “[A] concept is successful if it effectively fulfills its functions—in short, 
if it is effective. We could say, then, that the goal of conceptual engineering is to design effective con-
cepts […]. Success is measured in terms of efficacy.”
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constraints that plausibly govern, in a context-sensitive way, any conceptual amelio-
ration—though possibly with no “unique optimal trade-off” (Machery 2017: 217). 
On these grounds, we will draw on Brun’s (2016: 1226 ff.) reconstruction of it in the 
form of a ‘Recipe for explicating [concepts]’; and that reconstruction will then serve 
as a procedural template for further elaborating our provisional method for concep-
tual engineering, by comparison with the original Carnapian framework.9 This move 
can be referred to as the ‘bootstrapping strategy.’10
Carnapian explication, as rebooted for the purposes of conceptual engineering, 
can be presented as a three-step process, measured by three parameters, and regu-
lated by two main requirements. The first step is conceptual regimentation, in which 
the target concept (a.k.a. the ‘explicandum’ in Carnap’s parlance) is clarified along 
two complementary dimensions. On the one hand, there is a relational dimension 
that specifies the system of concepts to which the target concept belongs, along with 
its status and function in relation to the other elements of that system. In the pre-
sent case, the target concept is that of concept, while the target conceptual system 
is composed of all the different principles and dimensions that together make up 
the theoretical and methodological framework of conceptual engineering—for our 
purposes, such a relational dimension has thus already been clarified (Sect. 2). On 
the other hand, there is an elementary dimension (as opposed to the relational one), 
which focuses on the target concept of a given engineering project, irrespective of 
its relationships to other elements of its conceptual system, with the aim of deter-
mining its structural properties (e.g., its logical form, lexicological type, etc.) and 
the range of its relevant uses (e.g., via a taxonomy of its meaningful applications). In 
the case at hand, such elementary clarification of the concept of concept will allow 
us to distinguish between two competing concepts of concept that are suitable for 
the purposes of conceptual engineering (Sect.  4). Together, these two dimensions 
of the first step of our rebooted Carnapian explication correspond to the descriptive 
aspect of conceptual engineering as a method (Sect. 2), for they roughly consist of 
mapping “what possible and actual concepts there are” (Eklund 2021).
The second step of our rebooted Carnapian explication corresponds to the assess-
ment phase of conceptual engineering. Thus, it consists of assessing the previously 
regimented target concept, including the identification of its improvable features, 
in terms of functional efficacy—in other words, for how well it fulfills its function 
as a cognitive device by being conducive to the execution of the cognitive task(s) 
that it is designed to enable. Three parameters, which are presented below in order 
of decreasing importance, are assessed. In Carnapian parlance, the first and most 
9 This allows for divergences from the original framework. In particular, instead of primarily serving 
explanatory theoretical purposes, our rebooted version of Carnapian explication will aim to better fit the 
cognitive quality of the target concept to its intended function in terms of efficacy (Sect. 2)—namely, that 
of the concept of concept for the purposes of conceptual engineering. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer 
for pressing me on this matter.
10 The bootstrapping metaphor was originally coined for a series of self-sustaining processes to better 
oneself that proceeds without external help; here, it is meant to illustrate the recourse to a precursory 
variant of conceptual engineering (viz., Carnapian explication) in order to engineer the concept of con-
cept in ‘conceptual engineering.’
 M. G. Isaac 
1 3
important of these parameters is fruitfulness, which means the suitability of the con-
cept under consideration for formulating generalizations. In theoretical cases, fruit-
fulness can be characterized by predictive power and testability in the context of jus-
tification, and by the power to produce new knowledge in the context of discovery 
(Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017). It therefore remains a rather malleable parameter, 
plausibly made up of a ‘cluster of criteria’ that may vary according to context and 
depending on the aim(s) of the explicator (Pinder 2017: 453 ff.). For our purposes, 
in a more applied fashion, it will be measured in terms of the scope and impact on 
our cognitive life that the available concepts of concept would ensure to conceptual 
engineering. Scope and impact, in turn, will be considered in light of the broad-
spectrum ambitions of conceptual engineering; and, more specifically, in light of the 
pervasiveness and profoundness of the “non-conceptual consequences” that concep-
tual engineering is expected to have on the whole of our cognitive life (Burgess and 
Plunkett 2013a: 1097). Essentially, scope will concern the range of concepts that can 
be processed by the method of conceptual engineering being considered—from “the 
most sophisticated […] to the most mundane” (ibid.)—while impact will concern 
the way conceptual engineering may affect people’s minds and cognitive lives (more 
on this in Sect. 5).
Exactness, which may be glossed in terms of unambiguity, precision, and con-
sistency, is the second of the three parameters for assessing a regimented concept 
in our rebooted version of Carnapian explication. In this case, consistency will 
mostly be contingent on the absence of constitutive principles that either contradict 
one another or conflict with otherwise uncontroversial facts (cf. Scharp and Sha-
piro 2017) and be detected by the presence of paradoxical issues. As for precision 
and unambiguity, they will be determined, respectively, by descriptive accuracy and 
descriptive adequacy. Both will depend on the quantity and quality of data available 
in the given framework, along with the framework’s theoretical purposes, but each 
will have different possible markers; namely, theoretical convergence in the case of 
precision and positive results in that of unambiguity. Finally, simplicity, which may 
be conceived in terms of both the definition and rules of use of the target concept, 
is the third and last parameter for assessing the regimented concept under consid-
eration. In the framework of conceptual engineering, it will depend on obtaining an 
operationalizable concept of concept. And this, in turn, will bear crucially on, first, 
the possibility of detecting the need for conceptual amelioration, and second, on the 
possibility of the prescribed change being implemented.11 These three parameters 
(viz., fruitfulness, exactness, and simplicity) will serve in assessing two competing 
regimented concepts of concept, then in choosing the one most conducive to the 
purposes of conceptual engineering (Sect. 5).
11 Note that, given the importance of the so-called ‘implementation challenge’ and other ‘feasibility con-
straints’ for projects in conceptual engineering (Cappelen and Plunkett 2020; Deutsch 2020a, 2021; Fis-
cher 2020; Jorem 2020; Koch 2020b; Machery forthcoming), and pace (Carnap 1950: 7), who takes it to 
be of ‘secondary importance,’ simplicity presumably overrules exactness, at least at times, when it comes 
to achieving conceptual changes. As already noted, our rebooted version of Carnapian explication might 
here radically diverge from the original framework (cf. footnote 9).
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The third and last of the three steps of our rebooted Carnapian explication coin-
cides with the improvement phase of conceptual engineering (Sect.  2), and thus, 
this step consists of improving the target concept on the basis of its previous assess-
ment. This improvement must meet two main requirements. First, it must preserve 
a certain degree of similarity with the original target concept. In line with the core 
theoretical principles of conceptual engineering (ibid.), similarity means here the 
continuity of the target concept’s function(s) with the conceptual system to which it 
belongs. In the present case, what will need to be preserved, then, is the explanatory 
function of the concept of concept for the cognitive functionalism that characterizes 
the conceptual system of conceptual engineering. Second, any improvement of the 
target concept must score better on the three parameters that make up the assessment 
phase of our methodological framework—namely, fruitfulness, exactness, and sim-
plicity. These two requirements provide guidelines for how to improve the concept 
of concept that will be selected as the most conducive to the purposes of conceptual 
engineering (Sect. 7).
4  The Mapping Project
By employing the rebooted Carnapian explication, the challenge can now be taken 
up of engineering the concept of concept at work in ‘conceptual engineering.’ The 
next step is to clarify the range of relevant uses of the concept of concept, for the 
purposes of conceptual engineering, via a typology of its meaningful applications 
(cf. Sect. 3). With this in mind, I shall now draw on a widely acknowledged, albeit 
not uncontroversial, dichotomy between two frameworks for theorizing concepts—
namely, the philosophical and psychological—which further correlate with differ-
ent approaches to and models of concepts (Johnston and Leslie 2012; Löhr 2018; 
Machery 2009; Peacocke 1992; Rey 1983, 1985). The controversial aspect of this 
dichotomy mostly bears on two things: First, on whether the distinction really exists; 
and second, on whether the two frameworks are compatible, and maybe even com-
plementary to one another, or rather are mutually exclusive of one another.12 Since 
the purpose here is only to clarify the different options available when it comes to 
choosing the best framework for theorizing concepts as the subject matter of con-
ceptual engineering (as opposed to, e.g., developing a putatively all-encompassing 
theory of concepts per se), none of these controversies affects the usefulness of the 
distinction as a heuristic. Be that as it may, both are described below in order to sub-
sequently assess them with regard to their respective conduciveness for conceptual 
engineering (cf. Sect. 2). This step can be referred to, in accordance with Eklund 
(2021), as ‘the mapping project.’
Mainstream analytic philosophy of mind and language (e.g., Burge 1993; Fodor 
1975; Peacocke 1992) forms the philosophical framework for theorizing concepts. 
Unsurprisingly, those who perceive conceptual engineering to be about concepts 
12 For a compendium of views on these controversies, see the commentaries in Machery (2010).
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commonly adopt it.13 In the standard view, concepts are construed as semantic enti-
ties (roughly, the components of our thought contents) endowed with a ‘semantic 
structure’ (Margolis and Laurence 2010, 219) that serves a referential function. Con-
strued thus, the semantic constituency of concepts becomes the focus. Typically, 
according to the so-called ‘classical model’ that still undergirds the philosophical 
approach, concepts consist of sets of separately necessary and jointly sufficient fea-
tures, which are further characterized as semantically analytical and epistemically 
a priori. These constitutive features, in turn, are usually understood as being both 
independent from one another and of equal weight or importance within the con-
ceptual structure they compose. In addition, they are usually meant to spell out the 
identity condition of that conceptual structure, along with its application criteria to 
the objects that fall within its extension. In light of this, the gist of philosophical the-
ories of concepts can be captured in their attempt “to determine the condition under 
which people can have propositional attitudes about the object of their attitudes” 
(Machery 2010: 199), in order to ultimately deliver “a priori, analytic truths about 
the world” (Machery 2017: 209).14
The psychology of concepts (e.g., Murphy 2004) is the alternative framework 
available to conceptual engineering for theorizing about its subject matter. In con-
trast to its philosophical counterpart, little attempt has been made so far, with the 
exception of Isaac (2020), Koch (2020a), Machery (2017), to capitalize on this 
research field for the purposes of conceptual engineering. According to the psy-
chological framework, concepts are viewed as cognitive entities endowed with a 
‘processing structure,’ which “explains how concepts figure in various mental pro-
cesses” (Margolis and Laurence 2010: 219). Thus, from this perspective, concepts 
are approached with a focus on their cognitive efficacy. Typically, according to the 
cognitive model that nowadays guides the psychological approach, concepts consist 
of structured bodies of information about some category of referents (viz., individu-
als, classes, substances, or event-types), which are retrieved and activated, or con-
structed, to play a causal/explanatory role in the cognitive processes that underlie 
most of our higher cognitive competences in relation to these referents (e.g., catego-
rization, deduction, induction, analogy-making, action-planning, linguistic under-
standing, etc.) (cf. Machery 2009:12). These bodies of information are themselves 
now consensually taken to be realized by different, compatible, and/or comple-
mentary cognitive structures (e.g., exemplars, prototypes, and theories), and made 
13 For example, see Brun (2016), Burgess and Plunkett (2013a), Chalmers (2011), Haslanger (2020), 
Plunkett (2015, 2016), Prinzing (2018), Richard (2020), Simion (2018a), Simion and Kelp (2020), 
Thomasson (2020), among others.
14 Two addenda to this basic characterization of the classical model (and its variants) are in order: First, 
“it’s natural to construe [the complex structure of concepts] in accordance with the Containment Model, 
where the components of a complex concept are among its proper parts. <It’s natural, but not mandatory. 
Alternatively, one could think of a classically structured concept as a node that stands in inferential rela-
tions to its defining features [viz., in accordance with the so-called ‘Inferential Model’]. The advantage 
of the Containment Model is that it makes especially clear which associated concepts are its defining 
features and which are incidental>” (Margolis and Laurence 1999: 9 <footnote 10>). Second, so-called 
‘neo-classical’ views either drop or modulate the sufficiency requirement for the constitutive conceptual 
features (Margolis and Laurence 1999: 52 ff.).
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up of different types of informational components (viz., information about single 
instances of category members in the case of exemplars, statistical information in 
the case of prototypes, and causal, functional, generic, and nomological information 
in the case of theories).15 In turn, these constitutive informational components are 
usually understood as being both interdependently influential on one another and 
of unequal weight or importance with respect to one another within the structured 
body of information they compose. With this in mind, we get to the gist of psycho-
logical theories of concepts in their attempt “to explain the properties of our higher 
cognitive competences” (Machery 2010: 199) through the formulation of “empirical 
propositions about the mind” (Machery 2017: 209).
Hopefully, this typology of the concepts of concept that are available to con-
ceptual engineering yields a clear alternative between these two neatly regimented 
options—namely, the philosophical and psychological. These two options will serve 
as ideal types for choosing the best concept of concept for construing the subject 
matter of conceptual engineering.
5  The Evaluative‑Prescriptive Project
The next step to fill the foundational gap in conceptual engineering is to assess the 
regimented philosophical and psychological concepts of concept and then choose 
the one most conducive to the purposes of conceptual engineering. This step cor-
responds to the second of the three steps of the rebooted Carnapian explication 
(Sect.  3) and can be referred to, again in accordance with Eklund (2021), as ‘the 
evaluative-prescriptive project.’ Below, it will be carried out in three rounds, follow-
ing our three recast Carnapian parameters of fruitfulness, exactness, and simplicity. 
The selected option will eventually provide us with a baseline from which to further 
improve the chosen concept of concept for the purposes of conceptual engineering 
(Sect. 7).
5.1  Round One: Scope and Impact
In the Carnapian explication reboot, fruitfulness, exactness, and simplicity serve to 
assess the efficacy of a concept with regard to its intended function. When applied 
to conceptual engineering, and especially given its broad-spectrum ambitions as a 
metaphilosophical movement (Sect. 2), the most important of the three parameters 
is fruitfulness. The fruitfulness of a concept describes its suitability for formulating 
generalizations. For our specific purposes, it is measured in terms of the resulting 
scope and impact each of the two competing concepts of concept will grant concep-
tual engineering on our cognitive life (Sect. 3). As we will see, in both scope and 
impact, the psychological concept of concept outclasses the philosophical one.
15 See Hampton (1997), Komatsu (1992), Goldstone et al. (2018), Machery (2009), Medin (1989), Mur-
phy (2004), Prinz (2002), Smith and Medin (1981), among others, for detailed reviews of the main theo-
retical paradigms in the literature on the psychology of concepts.
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In terms of scope, the issue at stake is whether the framework under considera-
tion allows for an exhaustive or restrictive application of conceptual engineering 
to the variety of our conceptual devices. In this regard, the philosophical approach 
fares worse than the psychological one. With this approach, concepts are taken as 
semantic entities. They are, as such, primarily driven by truth requirements and fur-
ther constrained by epistemic standards. In other words, when they enter, as unsatu-
rated components, the formation of full thought contents, they are intended to pro-
vide us with true beliefs about their referent(s).16 Consequently, the philosophical 
concept of concept restricts the scope of items tractable by conceptual engineering 
to the most sophisticated ones only (that is, the theoretical concepts), to be re-engi-
neered in accordance with standards proper to them (for instance, that of scientific 
rationality), so that they better serve their theoretical purposes (such as formulating 
true generalizations of explanatory value). Otherwise, were the scope of conceptual 
engineering broadened so as to include more mundane concepts, one would end up 
applying theoretical standards to them, building on the unwarranted assumption that 
there is a correspondence between the two (Carnap 1950: 8–11). And this would 
amount to nothing less than metábasis eis állo génos (cf. Strawson 1963). In such 
cases, indeed, mundane, non-theoretical concepts are usually treated as ‘prescien-
tific’ (Carnap 1950: 1) glitches to fix so that they align better with the scientific 
image of the world (cf. Sawyer 2018, 2020a, b).17
By contrast, the psychological approach treats concepts as cognitive entities. As 
such, they are constrained mostly by pragmatic standards and ultimately driven by 
efficacy requirements. That is, when concepts are activated to play a role in the cog-
nitive processes that underwrite the exercise of our higher cognitive competences, 
they are intended to enable the execution of the cognitive tasks we use them for, 
independently of any alethic or epistemic concerns.18 Consequently, the psychologi-
cal concept of concept broadens the purview of conceptual engineering so that it 
ranges from the more mundane to the most sophisticated concepts, while at the same 
time respecting their diversity through the valuation of their functional efficacy 
according to multiple standards and purposes, ranging from the exposure and pre-
vention of fallacies to the promotion of group agency or changes in group identities, 
16 In the literature on conceptual engineering, Simion (2018a: 923) clearly articulates this view: “Con-
cepts, just like beliefs, are representational devices, their function is an epistemic one: to represent the 
world. In virtue of this function, concepts will be properly functioning when responsive to epistemic 
reasons, and malfunctional when responsive to practical reasons. Concepts will be good concepts qua 
concepts when they are epistemically good.”
17 Think for instance of the zealous biologist who would want you to revise or replace your lay concept 
of berry, the one you use at the fruit stall, in accordance with the actual scientific taxonomy, which clas-
sifies bananas and eggplants in the berry category, but excludes strawberries, blackberries, etc. See also 
Isaac (2021a), McKenna (2018), Podosky (2018), Simion (2018a, 2018b), for why epistemic standards 
may stand in the way of ameliorative projects about social kind concepts, both in terms of constructionist 
and realist ontologies.
18 As Machery (2017: 222) states: “The class of concept-underwritten inferences is distinguished in psy-
chological terms, exactly as is the class of concept-constitutive bliefs [sic, belief-like states]. It is nei-
ther semantic nor epistemological. The class of concept-underwritten inferences neither articulates the 
semantic content of the concept (its meaning), nor does it have any distinctive justificatory status.”
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via the alteration of people’s daily behaviors by nudging certain cues in their choice 
architecture, etc.19 Therefore, in terms of scope, the different outcomes for the philo-
sophical and psychological options boil down to their relative, that is, more or less 
appropriate, calibration to conceptual diversity.
In terms of impact, the issue in question is whether the philosophical or psycho-
logical framework allows for a more direct connection with people’s minds and cog-
nitive lives.20 The philosophical option also fares worse here because, in its view 
of concepts as semantic entities, concepts act as mere regulatory principles for the 
epistemic (viz., knowledge-related) processes and competences of some ideal epis-
temic agent. This becomes obvious when one considers what likely count among 
the most important desiderata for any philosophical theories of concepts, along 
with their corresponding explanatory purposes: On the one hand, the stability of 
content for explaining the agent’s rational/logical inference-making, as well as the 
‘publicity’ or ‘shareability’ of concepts between agents; and, on the other hand, the 
compositionality of content for explaining the systematicity and productivity of the 
agent’s thought. In this light, philosophical theories of concepts may indeed only 
serve to formulate normative possession and application conditions for concepts that 
are primarily met, if not only, by agents who are both idealized and epistemic.21 As 
a consequence, the philosophical concept of concept threatens to turn conceptual 
engineering into the rather frivolous activity of fiddling with representational con-
tents whose bearing on semantic facts is neither necessary nor sufficient to effect the 
desired changes in people’s cognitive abilities and behaviors, since these contents 
need not be grasped, fully, correctly, or even possibly, by those who actually do pos-
sess and use them.22 Therefore, the philosophical approach seemingly allows con-
ceptual engineering to have only a very limited impact on our actual cognitive life.
By contrast, in the psychological view of concepts as cognitive entities, con-
cepts operate as constitutive principles for the cognitive processes and competences 
of real cognitive agents. They are bodies of information about some category of 
19 More prosaically, to follow up with a comparison to the previous example (footnote 17), the standards 
will vary depending on whether you are drawing up botanical taxonomies in biology class or searching 
for a tasty ingredient to top up your crumble recipe.
20 One might wonder whether characterizing impact in terms of the closeness of connection to people’s 
minds and cognitive life does not unduly privilege the psychological option. Given that impact so con-
strued builds on the general characterization of conceptual engineering (Sect. 2), such privileging would 
instead confirm the greater intrinsic conduciveness of the psychological concept of concept for the pur-
poses of conceptual engineering. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
21 Burge (1993: 314–315) articulates this “‘traditional view’ of concepts” in exemplary fashion: “A met-
aphysically correct definition—one that states actual necessary and sufficient conditions, indeed essen-
tial or fundamental individuating conditions for instantiating a kind—need not be known, or knowable 
on mere reflection, by someone who has the concept. […] The meaning of a term [viz., the concept] 
at a given time is fixed by what an ideally reflective speaker would articulate by reflecting on all his 
intuitions, beliefs, dispositions to apply a term, and so on, with no reliance on advances in non-linguistic 
knowledge.”
22 Think for instance of how the meaning of the term ‘marriage’ has been expanded to include same-sex 
unions: If no one grasps it, marriage equality activism will not have achieved its goal (non-sufficiency 
condition); on the other hand, if belief-like states about same-sex unions come to underlie people’s use of 
the term, changes in its meaning seem to be supererogatory (non-necessity condition).
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referents that are activated, or constructed, to play a causal role in the processes 
that underlie the exercise of our higher cognitive competences. Characterized in this 
way, they serve psychological theories of concepts as explanans that contribute to 
producing empirical propositions about how our minds actually work. The psycho-
logical concept of concept thus turns the assessment and improvement phases of 
conceptual engineering into a twofold operation of first making explicit the typically 
opaque role that “concepts play in people’s cognitive life” (Machery 2017: 224), 
and second, of changing people’s minds and ways of thinking when they are found 
to be improvable. As a result, the psychological approach to conceptual engineer-
ing appears to be both necessary and sufficient to bring about the desired changes 
in people’s cognitive behaviors and abilities.23 Thereby, it arguably secures a strong 
impact for the method of conceptual engineering on the whole of our cognitive life. 
As Machery (2017: 231) expressed it: “Concepts determine the inferences we are 
prone to draw, and our thoughts follow their tracks. Understanding these inferences 
in order to assess them is one of the reasons why conceptual [engineering] mat-
ters.” In sum, the psychological concept of concept outclasses the philosophical 
one according to both criteria for measuring fruitfulness in our version of Carna-
pian explication repurposed for conceptual engineering—namely, in both scope and 
impact.
5.2  Round Two: Unambiguity, Precision, and Consistency
Exactness is the second of our three parameters for assessing the efficacy of a con-
cept with regard to its cognitive function. For our purposes, exactness has been char-
acterized in terms of unambiguity, precision, and consistency (Sect. 3). Here as well, 
the psychological concept of concept outclasses the philosophical one. Let’s con-
sider these three qualities in reverse order.
Consistency hinges on the absence of inconsistent constitutive principles that 
either contradict one another or conflict with otherwise uncontroversial facts and is 
detected by the presence of paradoxical issues. For instances of conceptual amelio-
ration, change is indisputable, and the conundrum lies in having to guarantee some 
form of continuity through it. Otherwise, without any limits imposed on amelio-
rative projects in terms of continuity, they become trivial, as this would allow for 
arbitrary replacements/revisions (such as of WORLD WAR II with  H2O). In brief, 
as Cappelen (2018: 97) notes: “We need to know: how much engineering is too 
much?”24
23 To follow up on the ‘marriage’ example above (footnote  22): If belief-like states about same-sex 
unions come to underlie people’s use of the term, nothing else is seemingly required for it to be deemed a 
successful project in conceptual engineering (sufficiency condition); and, on the other hand, without such 
changes in people’s belief-like states, marriage equality activism will not have achieved its goal (neces-
sity condition).
24 Note that what has come to be known in the literature as the ‘discontinuity objection’ (cf. Strawson 
1963: 505–506) primarily affects ‘revisionary’ attitudes toward conceptual engineering, which aim to 
ameliorate some conceptual devices through their modification, while leaving rather untouched the ‘revo-
lutionary’ camp, whose take on conceptual engineering amounts to replacing deficient concepts with bet-
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In this regard, the philosophical concept of concept fares worse than the psy-
chological one because, as per its constitutive rationalist standards (Sect. 5.1), the 
former has to comply with a diachronic stability requirement for conceptual con-
tent. This requirement, which furthermore is meant to hold true ‘between-individ-
ual’ (Machery 2009: 14), conflicts de facto with the very possibility of conceptual 
change. Consequently, those who endorse a semantic approach to concepts for con-
ceptual engineering end up resorting to some cumbersome notions and/or entities 
when they set out to address the ‘discontinuity objection’ and ensure the possibility 
that a concept changes while remaining the same, for instance, by talking of the 
‘central function’ of concepts (Haslanger 2000), their ‘proper function’ (Thomasson 
2020), and ‘essential features’ (Prinzing 2018), or by introducing ‘topics’ on top of 
concepts as their stable target (Sawyer 2018, 2020a, b). Since they are merely con-
ceived to account for the effect they are meant to cause, all these strategies can quite 
rightly be discarded as ad hoc stipulations bereft of proper explanatory power.25
There is nothing comparable for those who endorse a cognitive take on concepts 
for conceptual engineering. Psychologically construed concepts also need to be sta-
ble, but “in a much more relaxed way” (Löhr 2018: 12)—that is, particularly, in 
a way that fits how our cognitive behaviors and abilities adapt to the complexities 
of the real world. For instance, in both their invariantist and contextualist versions, 
the stability requirement for psychological concepts of concept allows for the (over-
all) information that is activated in our concept-involving cognition to vary across 
context in accordance with the cognitive task to be executed (e.g., Machery 2015). 
Thus, what needs to be preserved in the psychological picture is only the causal/
explanatory role that the concept plays in the processes that underlie the exercise of 
our higher cognitive competences. And such functional continuity of concepts, at 
work ‘within-individual’ only (Machery 2009: 14), can quite easily accommodate 
radical changes, because the (re-)engineered concept ultimately only needs to enable 
us to execute the cognitive task we used it for, regardless of diachronic or inter-agent 
discontinuities. Furthermore, contrary to its philosophical counterparts, the cogni-
tive function of psychologically construed concepts has its own independent ration-
ale—namely, to contribute to explaining how our minds work (Sect. 4).
The result is the same for precision, understood in terms of descriptive accu-
racy, with theoretical convergence as a possible marker. Indeed, the philosophical 
approach is infamous for having failed to identify the basic constitutive features of 
concepts. As Machery (2017: 234) notes, “most philosophers analyzing concepts by 
means of the method of cases have missed the fact that typically people do not form 
bliefs [sic, belief-like states] about necessary and sufficient membership conditions 
and the fact that typicality gradients are an important manifestation of concepts.” 
ter surrogate(s) simpliciter, regardless of continuity concerns, or at the least, with less concern for these 
(e.g., Burgess 2014; Scharp 2013, 2020).
Footnote 24 (continued)
25 Another option is to adopt a more permissive semantic approach that leans toward a cognitive take 
(e.g., in the vein of Brigandt’s [2010] ‘concept’s epistemic goal’) or to conceive of meanings as tempo-
rally extended, malleable, and plastic entities, at least when talking about socially constructed properties 
and kinds (Greenough ms.).
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And “fail[ing] to hone in on such basic features” (ibid.) prevents the emergence of 
theoretical consensus around a well-supported model of concepts, as witnessed by 
the “smorgasbord of options for how to think about concepts” (Cappelen 2018: 141) 
semantically. By contrast, the psychology of concepts has witnessed many empiri-
cal advances over the years concerning the constitution of conceptual structures as 
being made up of specific bodies of information about some categories of referents 
(viz., individuals, classes, substances, event-types), along with the growing theoreti-
cal consensus on the compatibility of their different basic types (e.g., exemplars, 
prototypes, theories, etc.) at work in the processes driving the exercise of our higher 
cognitive competences (e.g., categorization, deduction, induction, analogy-making, 
action-planning, linguistic understanding, etc.). And these many empirical advances 
provide substantial ground for choosing the psychological approach over the philo-
sophical one when it comes to theorizing concepts as the subject matter of an action-
able method.
Lastly, in regards to unambiguity, which is understood in terms of descrip-
tive adequacy with positive theoretical results as possible markers, the semantic 
approach is also ill-reputed for having failed to deliver any successful (positive) 
analysis of concepts qua definition-like structured entities—otherwise known in the 
literature as ‘Plato’s Problem’ (Margolis and Laurence 1999: 14). In contrast, the 
many empirical explanatory results about the mind’s higher cognitive competences 
produced and replicated in the psychology of concepts over the last 50 years (see 
footnote 15) provide additional reasons for choosing the psychological concept of 
concept over the philosophical one when it comes to theorizing about concepts as 
the subject matter of an actionable method. To sum up, given the bad track record 
of the semantic approach to concepts, along with the discontinuity conundrum, the 
philosophical concept of concept is again outclassed: Its psychological counterpart 
is superior when it comes to assessing its own efficacy with regard to exactness, 
which is characterized, in our rebooted Carnapian explication, by unambiguity, pre-
cision, and consistency.
5.3  Round Three: Definition and Rules of Use
Simplicity is the third and last of our parameters for assessing the efficacy of a con-
cept with regard to its cognitive function. Simplicity has been analyzed above into 
two components—namely, definition and rules of use. The definition component 
critically bear on the possibility of obtaining an operationalizable concept of con-
cept, while the rules of use component depends on the usability of that definition to 
detect the need for conceptual amelioration and then to implement the prescribed 
changes (Sect. 3). In both respects, the psychological concept of concept outclasses 
the philosophical one.
Beginning with the issue of definition, and as a corollary of its failure to iden-
tify the basic constitutive features of concepts (Sect. 5.2), the semantic approach has 
failed to provide any operational characterization of concepts—that is, an articulated 
statement of procedures specifying how to detect the theoretical entities ‘concept’ in 
an experimental setting (including thought experiments). In contrast, the cognitive 
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approach simply provides such an operational characterization of concepts, as a 
corollary of the theoretical convergence about its descriptive accuracy (ibid.). For 
instance, according to invariantist models, the bodies of information that constitute 
concepts are seen as being retrieved by default from our long-term memory to play a 
causal/explanatory role in the cognitive processes that underwrite our higher cogni-
tive competences (cf. Sect. 4); and this defaultness condition can in turn be opera-
tionalized by a homeostatic cluster of three properties (namely, speed, automaticity, 
and context-independence), which itself enables the detection of concepts in various 
experimental settings (Machery 2015). As we turn to the issue of rules of use, the 
availability of such operational characterization, or lack thereof, thus directly fos-
ters, or hinders instead, the usability of the definition under consideration for devis-
ing an actionable method for detecting the need for conceptual amelioration and 
then implementing prescribed changes.
In effect, as a corollary of its failure to deliver any successful conceptual analysis 
(Sect. 5.2), the semantic approach offers dim prospects for devising an actionable 
method to detect the need for conceptual amelioration. This methodological short-
coming has been clearly established on the basis of the substantial body of empirical 
evidence gathered over the last twenty years by the negative program in experimen-
tal philosophy against the reliance on intuitions, usually via the method of cases, 
for testing conceptual analyses and thereby ascertaining the actual content of con-
cepts, which is crucial for detecting the need for conceptual amelioration (Sect. 2). 
According to Machery (2017: 234), in terms of ‘the poverty of the method of cases 
for conceptual analysis’: “The method of cases 1.0 is not suited for examining con-
ceptual diversity; it is poorly suited to identify the weights of the properties rep-
resented by concepts and the interactions between these properties; its capacity to 
identify the properties represented by concepts is limited; and it often relies on dis-
turbing cases.” Notwithstanding a few possible improvements, such methodological 
insufficiency disqualifies the semantic approach to concepts as a way to devise an 
actionable method for detecting the need for conceptual amelioration.
Furthermore, when it comes to then implementing prescribed conceptual changes, 
the semantic approach faces the following dilemma (Deutsch 2020a, b): Either the 
stipulative revisions/replacements prescribed are meant to operate at the individual 
level of speaker-meaning and speaker-reference, in which case conceptual engineer-
ing is reduced to triviality, for we do this all the time without even being aware of 
it; or these revisions/replacements target the communal level of semantic-meaning 
and semantic-reference, in which case conceptual engineers owe us an account of 
how to scale up from the individual level to the collective level and actually secure 
uptake for the prescribed changes—besides the inscrutability and uncontrollability 
of the many various factors that presumably affect the determination of semantic-
meaning and semantic-reference (Cappelen 2018).26 Therefore, with respect to both 
the evaluative and prescriptive components of conceptual engineering (Sect. 3), the 
semantic approach to concepts fares poorly.
26 As Deutsch (2020a) convincingly argues, the implementation problem outstrips the so-called ‘exter-
nalist challenge’ to conceptual engineering (Koch 2018).
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By contrast, the cognitive approach once again proves much better on the two 
aspects of the rules of use specified above. First, in terms of the prospects it offers 
for devising an actionable method to detect the need for conceptual amelioration, the 
cognitive approach can already rely on a ready-to-use experimental method of cases 
which both overcomes the limitations of its armchair predecessor and has already 
proved its suitability for assessing the content and deployment of psychologically 
construed concepts. For instance, for understanding people’s ways of thinking 
about things and squaring them with alternative images of the world in order to see 
whether and where they match with one another or instead are at odds (Machery 
2017: 232 ff.); for assessing the control competent thinkers have when it comes to 
reasoning with new concepts (Fischer 2020); or for testing the prospects of proposed 
ameliorations to be successfully implemented for a certain class of concepts (Mach-
ery forthcoming).27 More generally, the cognitive approach will easily avail itself of 
a wide range of proven procedures, models, and methods from the social and cogni-
tive sciences, from psycholinguistic experiments to framing via cognitive semantics, 
because the relevant ones build on psychological models of concepts (e.g., as exem-
plars, prototypes, or theories) as their target objects.
When it comes to implementing the prescribed conceptual changes, the psycho-
logical concept of concept is once again promising. Typically, in an invariantist 
model (see above), conceptual changes can be implemented by targeting either the 
content or the use of our conceptual structures. In the former, we would aim to re-
delineate the default bodies of information that underwrite the exercise of people’s 
higher cognitive competences about some category of referents by, for instance, 
changing relevant parameters in the physical environment they are frequently 
exposed to.28 In the latter, we would endeavor to mitigate the default deployment of 
people’s concept-underwritten inferences by, for instance, changing the usage pat-
tern of a word.29 Neither of these options, to be sure, is trivial or impossible ( cf. 
Deutsch 2020a, 2021), as when the government’s health campaigns directed us, with 
mixed success, to enact the concept of social distancing by socializing distantly with 
others (by using Zoom, keeping two meters apart, wearing masks), instead of dis-
tancing ourselves socially from one another (that is, by not seeing and talking to 
anyone anymore), as would have naturally been expected from what is written on 
the tin (namely, ‘social distancing’). In sum, when it comes to simplicity analyzed 
in terms of definition and rules of use in our rebooted version of Carnapian explica-
tion, the psychological concept of concept surpasses the philosophical one in both 
regards.
27 In the same spirit, see also Nicholas Shea and colleagues’ work on metacognition directed at concept 
dependability and its impact on various cognitive processes ( e.g., Shea 2019; Thorne 2021).
28 For example, achieving gender balance in the professional world could lead to modifying the content 
and structure of people’s profession concepts and thereby contribute to mitigating the stereotypical gen-
dered biases in their categorization process and general behaviors about these categories of profession.
29 For example, psycholinguistic studies have shown that the automatic deployment of gender-related 
stereotypical inferences may be mitigated by the explicit marking of deviation from stereotypes (‘male 
secretary’) or salient uses via, e.g., contextual cues (‘scratches his beard’) (Fischer 2020; Fischer and 
Engelhardt 2017).
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5.4  Assessment Summary
In every respect, the psychological concept of concept, rather than the philosophi-
cal one, proves to be the most conducive to the purposes of conceptual engineering. 
Moreover, it also spares conceptual engineering from being turned into something 
akin to Mr. Jourdain’s prose: A mere fancy label for something we have been doing 
all along—namely, conceptual analysis, modulo a normative bent.30 Consequently, 
it is the one that should be preferred in order to conceive of concepts as the sub-
ject matter of conceptual engineering and make it an actionable method, that is, a 
method capable of being effectively applied to specific case studies.
6  Objections and Replies
In this final section, I shall consider and rebut three critical objections to my case 
for a psychological theorization of concepts as cognitive entities for use in concep-
tual engineering, all of which concern Sect. 4. They are addressed below in order of 
decreasing importance.
6.1  The Strawman Objection
To begin with, with regard to my framing of the philosophical approach, one may 
object that the classical theory of concepts is now a strawman. To this, I would sim-
ply reply that, from Burge (1993) to Margolis and Laurence (2019), it is still part of 
the traditional view to construe concepts as being endowed with some kind of defi-
nitional structure. Moreover, I would add that, whatever the case may be, it remains 
that the definitionist model of concepts still plays a normative role in that it repre-
sents a kind of regulatory, non-constitutive ideal which “the ‘Standard Model’ of 
philosophical inquiry” (Nado 2020a: 2) must comply with.31 In this respect, I would 
assert that the classical theory of concepts remains instrumental, albeit covertly, in 
current mainstream philosophical methodology—some have even recently defended 
the suitability of the classical definitionism for conceptual engineering.32
Yet, one may then argue more subtly that, on account of its reliance on the clas-
sical model, my ‘philosophical concept of concept’ only concerns a subset of philo-
sophical theories of concepts, namely, the Containment Model, based on an inter-
nalist understanding (cf. Rey 2010), and one may thus question whether my critique 
rightfully extends to the Inferential Model, as well as to externalist accounts, in both 
30 From The Middle Class Gentleman by Moliére (Act 2, Scene 4): “By my faith! For more than forty 
years I have been speaking prose without knowing anything about it, and I am much obliged to you for 
having taught me that.”
31 Nado (2020a: 2) aptly portrays the Standard Model: “Philosophers, so the story goes, are in the busi-
ness of producing and testing conceptual analyses. And intuition, generally via the method of cases, is 
our primary source of evidence for the success (or more commonly, the failure) of an analysis.”
32 “Necessary and sufficient conditions fare poorly in capturing our actual concepts, but I see no reason 
to abandon them as the gold standard in conceptual engineering.” (Nado 2020b: 10, footnote 4)
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the Containment and Inferential Models (see footnote 14). Here, my response would 
be that seemingly both the Containment and Inferential Models, in both their inter-
nalist and externalist forms, match my general description of the philosophical con-
cept of concept, insofar as they all attempt to account for the conditions under which 
ideal epistemic agents can have propositional attitudes about the object of their atti-
tudes, and thereby deliver “truths about the world” (Machery 2017: 209). And they 
may well do so, whether as applicability conditions, in the form of basic semantic 
features an object must satisfy in order to be included in a concept’s extension, as 
traditional internalist models would have it, or as reference-fixing conditions, in the 
form of “a higher-order test for determining what the correct applicability conditions 
are, without actually providing the applicability conditions themselves” (Schroeter 
2004: 430), as in modern externalist-compatible models. But, in both cases, they 
radically differ from the project of explaining the processes that underlie our higher 
cognitive competences and thereby delivering “empirical propositions about the 
mind” (Machery 2017: 209). And I would point out that such epistemically respon-
sive, truth-driven aims, which characterize the semantic approach in opposition to 
its cognitive counterpart, have been shown to work poorly for the purposes of con-
ceptual engineering, especially when it comes to the scope and impact this approach 
grants conceptual engineering with regard to our conceptual apparatuses (Sect. 5.1). 
As a matter of fact, very few conceptual engineers are likely to be found aiming to 
make semantic changes an end in themselves, without care for “any non-semantic 
state of affairs obtaining” (Riggs 2019: 6).
I am willing to grant, however, that the Inferential Model can be seen as modeling 
the inferential patterns that concepts underwrite. But, in this case, I would first call 
for distinguishing between two versions of inferentialism: On the one hand, a seman-
tic-epistemic version that sees concepts as underwriting inferential transitions that 
hold between the propositions they help forming and to which we are entitled; and, 
on the other hand, a psychological-cognitive variant that sees concepts as underwrit-
ing the exercise of our higher cognitive competences and to which we are reactive. 
I would then reject the possibility of understanding the inferential modeling either 
semantically or epistemically—that is, as articulating the concept’s meaning, or as 
tracking a certain type of information that has some kind of “distinctive justificatory 
status” (Machery 2017: 222) (see footnote 18), respectively—in favor of its psycho-
logical-cognitive construal, which is meant to capture “[the] inferences the mind is 
disposed to draw, that, so to speak, spring to mind, that it only resists when attention 
is drawn to particular facts that defeat this disposition” (Machery 2017: 222).
6.2  The Dual Content Objection
Following upon the previous objection, one may contend that philosophical and psy-
chological theories of concepts are not mutually exclusive, but instead compatible 
and complementary frameworks, dealing with “different aspects of the same kind” 
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(Löhr 2018: 2).33 Notwithstanding the burden of having to explain in what sense 
concepts can be said to be ‘of a same kind’ (cf. Machery 2005, 2006, 2009; Pic-
cinini and Scott 2006; Weiskopf 2009), I am perfectly willing to acknowledge that 
concepts characterized psychologically and philosophically share some common 
ground, however minimal: Both are types of intentional content. Yet, in the case of 
psychological theories of concepts, the bodies of information that constitute con-
cepts are functionally characterized as cognitive entities, and such characterization 
is neither semantically nor epistemically based—for instance, distinctively, it does 
not build on the analytic/synthetic or on the a priori/a posteriori distinction. There-
fore, the psychological take on concepts has no truck with attempts to determine 
the conditions under which ideal epistemic agents may have propositional attitudes 
about the objects of their attitudes, perhaps in the hopes of spelling out some “truths 
about the world” (Machery 2017: 209). It only cares about real people’s mind; and 
this, I assert, is what conceptual engineering should be all about: Changing people’s 
cognitive lives, abilities, and behaviors. As Nado (2020a: 4) states, cognitive effi-
cacy is the chief aim of conceptual engineering; “truth and knowledge, by contrast, 
are secondary goals at best.”34 Thus, even if concepts were to be of a unique kind 
whose different aspects were theorized about by different, yet compatible and com-
plementary, frameworks, the non-psychological one would not serve the purposes of 
conceptual engineering.
6.3  The Concept‑Conception Objection
In the same vein as the previous objection, one may eventually consider refram-
ing the dichotomy between philosophical and psychological concepts of concept in 
terms of the distinction between concepts and conceptions, respectively (Rey 1983, 
1985, 2010), and then assert, in accordance with Greenough (2020: <ms.>), that 
“<Conception Engineering is all we really need>” (see also Sawyer 2018, 2020c). 
However, this would be problematic. First, because ‘conception’ is a fuzzy philo-
sophical notion, whose psychological counterpart can be, by contrast, clearly char-
acterized and forms a well-established disciplinary field (namely, that of the psy-
chology of concepts), with abundant, replicated, and widely accepted empirical 
results (see footnote  15); second, by the same token, because suggesting that the 
concept of concept should be restricted to its philosophical acceptation (with no fur-
ther qualification) would give credence to the cliché of philosophy’s arrogant igno-
rance about empirical information (then relegated to concern conceptions only); 
and third, most importantly, because the concept-conception distinction builds on 
the assumption of the complementarity of both its components along with the onto-
logical and epistemic prevalence of the former over the latter. Conceptions, indeed, 
33 Mutatis mutandis, this could be recast in terms of the ‘Dual content’ theories of concepts—hence the 
title of this subsection.
34 See Sterken’s (2020) ‘linguistic interventions’ as ‘transformative communicative disruptions’ and 
Cantalamessa’s (2019) ‘conceptual activism,’ and Isaac’s (2021a) ‘post-truth conceptual engineering’ for 
paradigmatic instances of non truth-driven conceptual engineering.
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typically correspond to the “inessential conditions associated with a concept” (Rey 
1985: 302), which merely intimate its ascribability to a real cognitive agent, whereas 
concepts supposedly comprise the essential conditions that determine their individ-
uation and possession by what looks like some kind of ideal epistemic agent (cf. 
Sect.  5). By contrast, when it comes to the psychological model advocated here, 
there are no other entities that concepts are associated with or dependent on. There-
fore, recourse to the concept-conception distinction would be misguided.35
7  Conclusion
This paper has focused on the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering, 
which is characterized as the method used for assessing and improving our concepts. 
The main problem it has addressed is that of the subject matter of conceptual engi-
neering, namely: How best to conceive concepts for the purposes of conceptual engi-
neering. My strategy for tackling this problem has been to deploy an early version 
of conceptual engineering in order to target the concept of concept at work in ‘con-
ceptual engineering.’ First, I established a provisional methodological framework 
against which to assess the conduciveness of a given concept of concept as subject 
matter for conceptual engineering (Sect. 3). Then, I distinguished two main compet-
ing concepts of concept that are available as subject matter for conceptual engineer-
ing—namely, the philosophical and psychological (Sect. 4). Finally, I assessed these 
two concepts of concept with the proposed methodological framework (Sect. 5). The 
main outcome of this assessment was that the psychological concept of concept beat 
its philosophical counterpart on all counts when it came to making conceptual engi-
neering actionable, that is, a method that can effectively be applied to specific case 
studies. Therefore, for the purposes of conceptual engineering, concepts should be 
conceived psychologically as cognitive entities.
At this point, one final objection might arise that this paper itself acts as a coun-
ter-example to its assumption and thesis, namely, that we need an agreed-upon con-
cept of concept for conceptual engineering, and, further, that this concept of concept 
should be construed psychologically. Fortunately, this objection is easy to rebut by 
simply denying its premise, namely, that, strictly speaking, the paper in itself con-
stitutes a case study in conceptual engineering. And this is consistent with the pre-
scriptive spirit of the paper, which aims to set the framework for future projects and 
research in conceptual engineering.
Now, once the philosophical framework and its semantic view of concepts has 
been dismissed in favor of a cognitive, naturalistic, and empirically informed one, 
the next step is to improve the psychological concept of concept further for the pur-
poses of conceptual engineering. As noted in our provisional methodological frame-
work (Sect.  3), the improvement phase of an engineering project must meet two 
requirements: First, the re-engineered concept has to maintain a certain degree of 
similarity with respect to the original target concept—in this case, by preserving the 
35 See Lalumera (2014) for a more positive appraisal of the value of the concept-conception distinction.
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explanatory function of the concept of concept for the cognitive functionalism that 
characterizes conceptual engineering’s view of our concepts as cognitive devices 
(Sect. 2); and second, the re-engineered concept has to score better on each of the 
three assessment phase parameters. These two requirements are already satisfied 
by the psychological concept of concept by virtue of its selection via comparative 
assessment with its philosophical counterpart. Yet, this selection goes further: It also 
provides us with a baseline from which the psychological concept of concept can be 
further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. For instance, in order 
to increase the scope and impact conceptual engineering may have on our concep-
tual apparatuses, future research in this direction could appropriately draw upon a 
psychological, invariantist characterization of concepts as bodies of information that 
are retrieved from our long-term memory to play a role in the cognitive processes 
that underlie our higher cognitive competences, and then combine it with a pluralist 
take on the basic kinds of bodies of information (e.g., exemplar, prototypes, and the-
ories) in the form of a model of concepts as “multiply realiz[ed] functional kinds” 
(Lalumera 2010: 218). However, this remains another story to be told.
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